Plato's pupil, while agreeing with his teacher in the affirmation of truth, cautioned that reality is not ideal. Aristotle's admonition, a "reality-check," was a corrective to the ideal. The Platonic ideal and the Aristotelian realitycheck play back and forth throughout the history of Western thought. The original teacher and pupil seemed widely separated in their particular epoch of the 4th century B.C. but as time elapsed the inifially perceived gap narrowed in the light of our proclaimed modem progress.^ Aristotle advised, in a manner consistent with his caution about the distinction between ideal and the real, that the best form of govemment must be arrived at in the light of reality rather than by the logic of an ideally derived system as Plato had done. Part of the reality that Aristotle assumed was that man is, as heard proverbially, by nature social and political and should be moral, which in other words says that the state is natural. A proposition which puts Aristotle closer to his teacher about the content of reality is that tmth and something greater than man in the universe keeps the state and man honest. This check on the pre-Socratic and modem false reality of man-centeredness is given succinctly in his observation that politics would be the highest science if man were the best thing in the universe which, he says, "man is not."^ The full implications of this proposition will be seen below.
The post-Aristotelians in part retum to the pre-Socratic position by their fundamental proposition that one ought to be concerned only with one's self Lost in the vastness of empire, without the advantage of an identifiable known enemy, the simple philosophies of self (Epicureans, Cynics, and Stoics) found focus only in those things which generated no pain, worry, or anxiety. Equanimity was the rule of the day which makes it small wonder that twentieth century commentators plumbed elements of Stoic revival in the beginnings of the modem era. At the end of our century we see the ancient philosophies of self "as in a magnifying glass."^ There was a retum to some of the civility of the structured classical Greek era in the Romans attention to law as the embodiment of the state. The law, as Cicero enunciated, could show both public spirited feelings and reason. The Roman contribution fused Platonic and Aristotelian emphasis on reason with post-Aristotelian concerns for feeling and self. As is commonly recognized, these Greeks and the Romans gave us the first and second pillars of Westem civilization, Greek philosophy and Roman law. The third pillar, Christianity, can, for present purposes, be observed in the contributions of Augustine and Aquinas.
Augustine, picking up from the theme that man is naturally social and political, that is, that the state is, as he said, "intended by the very order of nature," offered in his Christian philosophy of society that the church and religion complete and make meaningful but do not supplant the state. The rich medieval discussions of the place of religion and society waxed and waned on the subject. The debate was concluded by Aquinas, however, in his adoption, perhaps adaption, of the Aristotelian corpus. For him it can be said that he accepts Aristotle, that he holds that (1) government is natural, (2) that the best form of government (a constant theme since Plato's search in his Republic) is a combination of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and that (3) religion and politics each have their place and accept one another.
Augustine had maintained, and Aquinas would heartily concur, that if God were not part of the explanation of human society, its origin, nature, and end, then man would find a "substitute" for this divine Infinity.^ Aristotle, in fact, had argued that politics itself would become the substitute in that earlier cited proposition that politics would become the highest science if man were the best thing in the universe. This core argument of classical thought was marvelously prescient about what would occur in modernity when Infinity was ignored.
There were signs of the undoing of the Christian medieval synthesis even in the era of its own domination as suggested by the writings of John of Paris, Marsilio of Padua, and Dante. Nonetheless the synthesis was maintained until the time of Machiavelli, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. Many commentators speak to the turning point with Machiavelli.'^ From the classical (Greek-Christian) perspective Machiavelli's place can be summed up in the propositions that he was (1) not concerned with truth, the ideal, or morality, (2) not concerned with religion except as a tool, (3) only concerned with personal success and the practical, and (4) maintained that everything (law, church, government) were to be used for success.
From the purely modern perspective it would be agreed that Machiavelli, the Prince, and the people alike, need not pay attention to good or bad but only to what may bring success. Such an assessment does not malign Machiavelli. It accepts him both for what he intended and for what his proponents give him credit. Prior to Machiavelli there had been a common center of thought, a dominant paradigm, which he challenged not so much by arguing with it as by ignoring it. Machiavelli's goal was to be attained not by following a moral compass but instead the facts of purely practical routes to "success." This shift ushered in the new science of politics which, like the new science of the physical world, took centuries to reach maturity.
Since the classical justification for the authority exercised by the state went out with the new paradigm a new justification was needed. The Protestant Reformation primarily had a quite different concern than those of politics. It did not and could not, however, fully avoid the political. It contributed indirectly to the new paradigmatic emphasis on science, the facts, and success as opposed to the traditional justification of political authority. The Protestant Reformation basically said that there are a variety of justifications for political authority. The different spokesmen such as Luther, Calvin, and the pseudonymous Stephen Junius Brutus, each had a different emphasis in terms such as individual duty, communal obligation, or, in Brutus, a precursor to the social contract. Unintentionally it seems their views augmented the march of modernity by assisting in the decline of the former unity.
Bodin sought to ameliorate the conflicts which then developed as a result of the new religions joining the political fray in Europe. He proposed that by focusing on the possession of political power alone, he called it "sovereignty," the exacerbation of the disputes by the religious dimension would be overcome.
Sir Hugo Grotius in affect seconded Bodin's perspective by assuring the world in the introduction to his famous De Jure Belli ac Pads that we can get along by reason and science alone with no attention to God.
Thomas Hobbes did just that. He is acclaimed as the first modem political philosopher'' because he deliberately devised an explanation of the political world with no reference to anything beyond the here and now. Despite the appearance of a chronological development from primitive condition to legal state he instead argued a logical point that the human desire for success (Machiavelli's focus) leads us to accept forceful law and order. Hobbes was arguing that without the potentially all-powerfiil state we would have a "state of nature" consisting of the war of each against each. To avoid that existential dread we will the Great Leviathan.
John Locke employed the same methodology as Hobbes except that he argued more for the success of individual acquisitiveness by recognizing the reasonableness of the economic state which provided constitutional guarantees for the enhancement of wealth. Both Hobbes and Locke were in the "scientific" mode of Machiavelli insofar as they were operating from "just the facts." That is, their justification for political authority was independent of any classical moral or theological considerations.'^ Theory is based on man alone.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, the third of the "big three" social contract theorists, followed in the same vein except that he recognized the existential dread for what it was, an enslavement. While he desired human freedom, which he proposed could be realized through what might be called the "desperate absurdities of the General Will," he despaired of its accomplishment. For him the overcoming of chains'^ and the attainment of freedom would require the impossible, changing human nature.
Rousseau should have been more patient and been broader in his outlook. His contemporary, David Hume, was in the process of showing that the notion of fixed natures was unwarranted. Thereafter Hume's insight sent the justification of human social order at a remarkably accelerated pace of relying on consensus, the original but unrealized ingredient of Rousseau's General Will.
Consensus found various initial expressions in modern thought. Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments was one in which the social market determined values. Jeremy Bentham provided a quantification of the market place of values and John Stuart Mill trumped quantity with a qualitative factor sanctioned by experts. (It sounds much like contemporary "liberal" politics.) In these market place morals the ancient bullion of "natures" or "essences" or "ends" were long forgotten in favor of empirically evoked standards. Equally evoked and harmful, although historically based as opposed to sociologically with the others, were the "conservative" standards espoused by Edmund Burke whose "prudence" eschewed classical first principles.'^ The foundation for moral obligation (responsibilities of individuals and relationships to others) based on consensus or pure logic had a relativism and dogmatism to them respectively. Immanuel Kant sought a justification which responded to these objections of relativism and dogmatism and yet the replacement had to be rationally based. Kant's ethics ("Practical Reason"), consonant with his logic ("Pure Reason"), maintained that intersubjective transmissible norms sanctioned by authority (the state and world government) would determine order in human affairs. He fully subscribed to the modem theme while conveniently side-stepping its direct controversies.
The sense of order to which Kant subscribed was viewed by Hegel as the product of a process over which humans have no control. According to Hegel we act out the role which has been assigned to us cosmically. Hegel allowed that we may have insight into the process and may in fact see ourselves, as Hegel pictured himself, as riding the crest of the wave of history. In a fascinating manner Feuerbach, in a Humean-like as well as a pre-Socratic-like move, saw the transcendent order and process of Hegel as the product of the human mind itself rather than from outside man. Feuerbach's only mistake according to Marx was that he failed to see that man's projections follow his historical and social condition. In placing man as an historical being at the center of the universe Marx accomplished the culmination of the process launched when modemity turned from the classical premises of first principles.
The culmination of Marx fulfills the "prophesy" and warning of Aristotle that "politics would be the highest science if man were the best thing in the universe."
The fulfillment came in the twentieth century totalitarian state whether found in Russia, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, or elsewhere. Oblivious to these consequences twentieth century thinkers, like late nineteenth century ones, either applauded modernity's accomplishments, or egged men on to have the courage of their new freedom. Nietzsche wanted humans to have the courage of their godless freedom. Heidegger saw courage in contemplating the poverty of our existence. Cassirer was courageously puzzled at the retum of myth (which was in fact the product of a process which he celebrated.)'^ Cassirer fled the totalitarian state which was the product of the returned myth. His philosophical rival, Heidegger, stayed behind and Heidegger's defenders are at pains not to find fault with him for doing so.
A host of twentieth century commentators fully subscribed to the premises of modemity. George Sabine in a very consistent manner wrote his complete "history of political theory" from the perspective of Humean relativism.'^ Learned Hand, one of our most celebrated jurists of the twentieth century, saw systems of first principles as being at war with our only trustworthy way of living in accord with the facts.'^ In other words, we can only live empirically since principles limit us. Erich Fromm, while offering reservations about the excesses of Soviet rule, fundamentally agreed with the principle that "man is the measure of all things.'"^ With this modern thought retumed from whence it began: Protagoras and the Sophists are back in full force where truth is relative to the disposition of the individual.
The great twentieth century product of the man-centered universe was the totalitarian state. The Soviet system occupied our attention for some seventy years. To many it was "the evil empire," the demi-god of a new man-made religion. For many years the "Cold War" was the primary element of United States' foreign policy, if not the whole of our politics. It certainly was the focus of our attention such that it muted disagreements on domestic issues. All the evils that humankind could do was thought to be concentrated in the totalitarian state. Catholics prayed for "the conversion of Russia." This "substitute infinity," where man in a practice based on theory making himself the measure of all things, had replaced the historical Infinity.
The New
Challenge Once the totalitarian embodiment of the substitute infinity vanished should there not have been a quick return to everything in its proper place? Should we not today, like times in the past, be preoccupied with composing hymns to the God who has saved us? It is not hard for us to recall the many biblical instances of deliverance and praise.
What is to be done when the disappearance of the recent primary identifiable substitute infinity does not automatically restore the original infinity (God)? This is a challenge specifically to the "Catholic Social Scientist." Having heartily fought the evil empire, the Catholic social scientist must respond to the larger though less readily identifiable modem challenge. In other words, some "Infinity therapy" needs to be offered to the various modem disciplines that assume the positivist, materialist based, man centered, perspective which had been building since "the sharp knife of Machiavelli's thought" had cut us off from the threads by which in former generations the state had been fastened to the organic whole of human existence, from religion, metaphysics, from all the other forms of man's ethical and cultural life.'^ And "infinity therapy" has to be broadened to include disciplines beyond the social sciences, e.g., math, sciences, engineering.
The simple logic is: if reality needs Infinity, so do the disciplines and institutions which purport to study reality. But there is resistance. The resistance is found in the questioning of any attempt to have a "Catholic" Mission Statement within Catholic institutions. The resistance is fierce within disciplines such as political science and the other social sciences and humanities as faculty at Catholic institutions claim "professional" immunity from anything religious. The other disciplines, that is, the natural sciences and related fields, assume an even greater immunity which, unwarrantably, leaves them professionally autonomous from the perspective of faith.
Infinity's place as something positive must be offered to academics and it needs to be articulated in considerable detail. This is an opportunity and a challenge to the SCSS. A few known "Catholic" colleges appear to have no problem with these issues. Somewhat surprisingly, our colleagues from secular institutions, operating at an individual and not an institutional level, also appear to have acceded to an appropriate Catholic principle in their disciplines, or at least their courses. These few write, act and live in a Catholic way. What must be done is to recognize that within academe substitute infinity has grown almost invisibly and has gained hegemony. That is, while preoccupied with the dominant substitute infinity of the evil empire other substitutes emerged which now must be dealt with. That is our challenge.
To recapitulate: Substitute infinity is what has taken the place of that which is greater than man in the universe. In Aristotle's thinking without something greater than man politics would be the highest science. Now the substitute, previously expressed in the modernized form of deified kingship of the totalitarian state, has found other expressions in drugs or sex on a personal level, and environmentalism, Americanism, scientism, feminism, or political activity, on an institutional level. Materialism, which Popes have criticized specifically since well before Marx, embraces both the individual and institutional levels. For any of these substitutes to succeed it is necessary to have a politics which is directed to man alone. That politics of man alone, it is sad to say, is attained when democracy becomes the norm with no "higher law background," to borrow a famous phrase from Edward S. Corwin.
This modern substitute infinity of nothing higher than man comes up in surprising places. Perhaps unwittingly, some proclaimed "conservative" champions turn out to be supporters of its jurisprudence. Justice Scalia, for example, has poised the conflict between judicial law making against democratic law making.^^ He claims that only the latter is allowed. He stated that "if the majority in a democratic society want abortion, then the state should allow it."^' This jurisprudence^^ cannot be ignored because the Justice otherwise says many favorable things.
The words conservative and liberal have been the source of much distraction in political thinking. Principles, in Catholic thought, should precede both liberal and conservative inclinations.
Historically, disagreements on principles, as in the religious wars before Bodin's political solutions, have inclined much of our academic discourse to be too circumspect. In trying to avoid conflict we pay the price of mitigating principles and by default the jurisprudence and policy consequences we wish to reject prevail.
The Pope incessantly speaks of principles which precede politics. In that spirit the Catholic social scientists can be urged to come up with answers to the challenges of academe, the disciplines, and the secular world. Those in agreement with the Pontiff on a particular issue are willing to cite his authority in bolstering their position. When there is disagreement there is another mode which wants to interpret, to distinguish, or to put into context. On abortion, for example, there is little quarrel. On the other hand, on capital punishment numerous fine points are made to justify what the Pope and the Bishops reject. It is said that capital punishment defends life, that it carries out God's justice by exacting a penalty which fits the crime. The Pope and Bishops, however, maintain that only when society cannot be secured from future harm might capital punishment be employed.
Capital punishment can be debated fraternally at another time. The point now is that those who would pledge allegiance to the Magisterium and would wish to see the principles of the faith both taught and adhered to in, at least, all institutions which call themselves Catholic need to work out more carefully consistent and accurate applications of other important principles. The Catholic social scientist needs to articulate how he or she sees the principles of faith apply in a broader way, indeed, in all fields within the University. That is, if substitute infinity is to be fully vanquished it is necessary to spell out how Infinity sheds light on all fields.
To reiterate, there is the challenge to spell out how each of the disciplines would go about refiecting adherence to objective scholarly analysis combined with fidelity to the Magisterium. Accordingly, SCSS's Steve Krason,^^ following and expanding upon Furfey, has presented a critique of secular sociology and social sciences in general. He examined eleven ways in which the secular social sciences, absent the truths of Catholic thought, are deficient. His is a clarion call for a meaningful Catholic social science. Citing SCSS colleague Joseph Varacalli, Krason calls for (1) objective social research, (2) which would assist the Church in understanding and reconstructing the social order, (3) apply Catholic principles to existing understandings, and (4) engage in a thorough public intellectual exchange.
In the March 1996 Newsletter^"^ of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars a similar call for a Catholic role in the natural sciences was set forth by Dominic Aquila, of Franciscan University of Steubenville. Aquila offered a "rationale and vision" for the natural sciences including biology, chemistry, physics, engineering, mathematics, and computer sciences. Citing the Catholic tradition from Augustine to Aquinas to Newman, Vatican II, and John Paul II, Aquila speaks of the unity of truth and the impossibility of conflict between the different sciences and faith, if truly considered.
Such calls for the Catholic truth resonate. But, what are the different sciences to do at a Catholic university? What will make them different from those same sciences at a secular institution? What precisely and concretely are they to do and how are we to measure them? Is it possible to be more specific? What would or should be done in biology? In sociology? In psychology? Geography? Computer sciences? Engineering? Should there not be a list of particulars in all the mentioned disciplines? And following that should there not be some mechanism for examining how and when disciplines and universities so comport themselves or do not? This is now dangerous territory, but if the issue of a truly Catholic university is affirmed to be so important, if the ingrained substitute infinity of secular materialism has established a demonic^^ hegemony in our world, then is it not necessary to be more than agreeably theoretical in rooting it out? Or is it sufficient to have required courses in all curricula, specialized or general, whereby each discipline would have its "Engineering Ethics," "Ethical Issues in Computer Science," "Ethics of This, " and "Ethics of That?" Then the problem is "simplified" to the content of the ethics courses and who teaches them.
As is known from the struggle over Ex Corde applied narrowly just to theology teaching, the task on "an ethics of everything," as just mentioned, is not so simple. If the Catholic college is different because it says it is different but all it has to show for it is ceremonial, then at some not too distant point market factors and the cost differential will mount an inexorable and fatal challenge. This is a long way from the starting point about substitute infinity in political thought but the effort has been pushed so that the issue and its consequences can be seen in academe.
The president of Providence College, Rev. Philip A. Smith, O.P., deals with some of these very issues in an article published in the FCS Newsletter}^ Addressing the faculty of his College Father Smith discusses the missions statement of the College, commenting about the liberal arts, the Catholic identity, the Dominican perspective, and educating for citizenship. Appropriately, Father Smith links the liberal arts tradition and Providence's Dominican-Thomistic traditions in educating the whole person. On the crucial issue of Catholic identity he acknowledges that it "cannot be reduced to inspirational phrases found in . . . recruiting and development literature, to courses taught in the theology department, or to pastoral counseling or liturgical celebrations . . . ." He says that the "religious identity must permeate the work and life of the College." Curiously at this point he turns to the "Catholic culture" and to its being "alive and oriented to the future," to its carrying on a "dialogue with contemporary culture." Asking how the Catholic heritage is to be reflected elsewhere in the curriculum, beyond the rigorously taught theology courses, he comes up with an answer that it cannot be found in the "polemical questions as: Is there a Catholic chemistry, biology, accounting or mathematics?" Though the Catholic heritage is "more relevant to literature and economics than it is to chemistry and biology . . . religious and moral issues should never be forced into classroom discussions ... [and] ... the classroom is not the place to preach. ..." He concludes the section on Catholic identity by observing that "even if there is no Catholic 'biology' or 'chemistry' . . . there is a Catholic perspective on the meaning and use of the data when they impinge on moral, religious and ethical questions." He calls attention to the "enormous contributions" made by the long and rich heritage of the Catholic tradition "to national and international problems such as social justice and economic policy, hunger and homelessness, war and the arms race, health care and welfare reform, immigration and the role of govemment in life."
On the "unique Dominican perspective," Father Smith tells us how it informs the Catholic tradition through its insistence that faith and reason be viewed as "distinct but inseparable" and "thus . . . can study all created reality according to the rigorous standards of human inquiry because we believe that the natural order is intelligible." He tells us that Aquinas "developed his search for truth by asking questions" and that this unique method of asking questions is constantly open to the future. It is this openness to the future which warrants the perspective of educating students "to be responsible citizens in society." He concludes by mentioning that "we live in a society deeply, and perhaps even dangerously, divided along the lines of religious beliefs and value systems, social behavior and political ideologies, national origin and ethnic backgrounds, race and class." It is his belief that the Catholic tradition of the common good can contribute to the quest for traditional and common values "by offering a vision of life in community. ..."
Looking back on what Father Smith said I can say that / believe him. However, is there anything in what he has said, other than his references to tradition and heritage, that could not be said by the president of any secular university? Indeed, "Veritas" appears on the crest of many distinguished secular colleges. The unity of faith and reason can be joined in by any single individual. Philosophy is a discipline for all persons. Questioning is open to all. Responsible citizenship is a goal of all educators. Maybe this is a good thing? Maybe it proves that Catholic universities are just as much universities as any other? Maybe this is what is wanted? The Catholic college is distinct by being like everyone else?
Troubling, though, is the concern that while elite private colleges cost more than most Catholic universities, state institutions cost much less.^"^ Except possibly for more frequent references to heritage and tradition in recruitment literature and some promotional pamphlets there is a serious challenge as to what, outside of possibly one required course in theology, the Catholic university has to offer as against the less expensive state institutions. Here note should be taken of the well-known resistance on the part of the presidents of most Catholic universities and colleges to the Pope and the bishops having a role with respect to the teaching of the critical discipline of theology in their institutions. If theology and its teaching is off limits to the Pope and bishops then how can anything else be certifiably Catholic?
Patrick Fagan addressing the "Political Confusion at The Catholic Conference"^^ suggests that the bishops overstep their competence in much that comes from the USCC. He says that laymen, policy analysts like himself, have a competence that bishops and the USCC lack. He calls for the bishops to stick to their competence in condemning particular moral evil and leave to the lay Catholic the practicality of how to get the moral evil off the books. His point is that "when bishops' institutions act outside their role they endanger the standing of the bishops' legitimate God-given authority." That may be a reasonable point and it is one on which many have had first hand experience when it comes to particular policy areas. Many felt as Fagan does and they expressed similar reservations during the period of the Cold War when American bishops appeared to be advocating a disarmament position contrary to American government policy. Others make similar distinctions when it comes to questioning the bishops' position on economic justice. It must be said, however, that referring, as Fagan does, to "clerical busybodyism in politics"^^ or by coming out with a conclusion that is knowingly directly contrary to what the bishops are teaching without some acknowledgment that they may be right is not helpful. Does not the Catholic social scientist, for example, need to show, according to his/her allegiance, a deference to the bishops? This is where "the challenge" challenges us. That is, we want to challenge the ingrained secular substitute infinity and we happily do so under the banner of the Magisterium. We are challenged, however, in this allegiance to attempt to understand the perspectives of our bishops, the U.S.C.C., and even our college presidents.
In the disagreement twenty years ago over disarmament there was the comfort for some of us that Rome seemed not in full agreement with what the U.S.C.C. was saying. When Rome and the American bishops are consonant it ought to be easier to see the ways of Rome. In political science, for example, there is the special need today in the area of welfare policy and in the much neglected area of international relations and the framework for a sound world order, including the issues of embargoes and dieir impact on the ordinary citizen. Thus, in addition to trying to reverse the perspective within our disciplines the Catholic social scientist is challenged to see the merits of the bishops' concerns without viewing the bishops as unreconstructed political liberals. If the Catholic social scientist is going to unreconstructed political liberals. If the Catholic social scientist is going to be a Catholic light for the world in the social sciences, we need to be constantly talking about expanding the agenda both in our fields and in the world. New topics need to be taken up at the same time as we go about the business of defining and refining what we expect from the respective disciplines. Our very principles challenge us to be wary of substitute infinity sneaking into our own measure of what is Catholic both in our disciplines and in the world.
Notes

